net: Limit socket I/O iovec total length to INT_MAX.

commit 8acfe468b0384e834a303f08ebc4953d72fb690a upstream.

This helps protect us from overflow issues down in the
individual protocol sendmsg/recvmsg handlers.  Once
we hit INT_MAX we truncate out the rest of the iovec
by setting the iov_len members to zero.

This works because:

1) For SOCK_STREAM and SOCK_SEQPACKET sockets, partial
   writes are allowed and the application will just continue
   with another write to send the rest of the data.

2) For datagram oriented sockets, where there must be a
   one-to-one correspondance between write() calls and
   packets on the wire, INT_MAX is going to be far larger
   than the packet size limit the protocol is going to
   check for and signal with -EMSGSIZE.

Based upon a patch by Linus Torvalds.

Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>

diff --git a/include/linux/socket.h b/include/linux/socket.h
index a8f56e1ec7602705d70ca326e620f1a8927e3925..a2fada9becb60c47fcbf8143b3b3c67d291731b8 100644 (file)
--- a/include/linux/socket.h
+++ b/include/linux/socket.h
@@ -322,7 +322,7 @@ extern int csum_partial_copy_fromiovecend(unsigned char *kdata,
                                          int offset, 
                                          unsigned int len, __wsum *csump);
 
-extern long verify_iovec(struct msghdr *m, struct iovec *iov, struct sockaddr *address, int mode);
+extern int verify_iovec(struct msghdr *m, struct iovec *iov, struct sockaddr *address, int mode);
 extern int memcpy_toiovec(struct iovec *v, unsigned char *kdata, int len);
 extern int memcpy_toiovecend(const struct iovec *v, unsigned char *kdata,
                             int offset, int len);

diff --git a/net/compat.c b/net/compat.c
index 63d260e8147290520212f50f1df27e638af9fe9e..3649d58953615fea0c0e1d1b5ba8882632df7676 100644 (file)
--- a/net/compat.c
+++ b/net/compat.c
@@ -41,10 +41,12 @@ static inline int iov_from_user_compat_to_kern(struct iovec *kiov,
                compat_size_t len;
 
                if (get_user(len, &uiov32->iov_len) ||
-                  get_user(buf, &uiov32->iov_base)) {
-                       tot_len = -EFAULT;
-                       break;
-               }
+                   get_user(buf, &uiov32->iov_base))
+                       return -EFAULT;
+
+               if (len > INT_MAX - tot_len)
+                       len = INT_MAX - tot_len;
+
                tot_len += len;
                kiov->iov_base = compat_ptr(buf);
                kiov->iov_len = (__kernel_size_t) len;

diff --git a/net/core/iovec.c b/net/core/iovec.c
index e6b133b77ccb5615d65bcdac0ecc01b759808c76..58eb9999f89db36dddb786be89326f091d403df6 100644 (file)
--- a/net/core/iovec.c
+++ b/net/core/iovec.c
@@ -35,10 +35,9 @@
  *     in any case.
  */
 
-long verify_iovec(struct msghdr *m, struct iovec *iov, struct sockaddr *address, int mode)
+int verify_iovec(struct msghdr *m, struct iovec *iov, struct sockaddr *address, int mode)
 {
-       int size, ct;
-       long err;
+       int size, ct, err;
 
        if (m->msg_namelen) {
                if (mode == VERIFY_READ) {
@@ -60,14 +59,13 @@ long verify_iovec(struct msghdr *m, struct iovec *iov, struct sockaddr *address,
        err = 0;
 
        for (ct = 0; ct < m->msg_iovlen; ct++) {
-               err += iov[ct].iov_len;
-               /*
-                * Goal is not to verify user data, but to prevent returning
-                * negative value, which is interpreted as errno.
-                * Overflow is still possible, but it is harmless.
-                */
-               if (err < 0)
-                       return -EMSGSIZE;
+               size_t len = iov[ct].iov_len;
+
+               if (len > INT_MAX - err) {
+                       len = INT_MAX - err;
+                       iov[ct].iov_len = len;
+               }
+               err += len;
        }
 
        return err;