Michael R. Hines [Tue, 18 Feb 2014 02:34:06 +0000 (10:34 +0800)]
rdma: bug fixes
1. Fix small memory leak in parsing inet address from command line in data_init()
2. Fix ibv_post_send() return value check and pass error code back up correctly.
3. Fix rdma_destroy_qp() segfault after failure to connect to destination.
Reported-by: frank.yangjie@gmail.com Reported-by: dgilbert@redhat.com Signed-off-by: Michael R. Hines <mrhines@us.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Juan Quintela <quintela@redhat.com>
(cherry picked from commit e325b49a320b493cc5d69e263751ff716dc458fe) Signed-off-by: Michael Roth <mdroth@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Gonglei [Mon, 19 May 2014 07:26:03 +0000 (15:26 +0800)]
qga: Fix handle fd leak in acquire_privilege()
token should be closed in all conditions.
So move CloseHandle(token) to "out" branch.
Signed-off-by: Wang Rui <moon.wangrui@huawei.com> Signed-off-by: Gonglei <arei.gonglei@huawei.com> Signed-off-by: Michael Roth <mdroth@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
(cherry picked from commit 374044f08fe18a18469b981812cd8695f5b3569c) Signed-off-by: Michael Roth <mdroth@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
qemu_bh_schedule() is supposed to be thread-safe at least the first time
it is called. Unfortunately this is not quite true:
bh->scheduled = 1;
aio_notify(bh->ctx);
Since another thread may run the BH callback once it has been scheduled,
there is a race condition if the callback frees the BH before
aio_notify(bh->ctx) has a chance to run.
Reported-by: Stefan Priebe <s.priebe@profihost.ag> Signed-off-by: Stefan Hajnoczi <stefanha@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com> Tested-by: Stefan Priebe <s.priebe@profihost.ag>
(cherry picked from commit 924fe1293c3e7a3c787bbdfb351e7f168caee3e9) Signed-off-by: Michael Roth <mdroth@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Cornelia Huck [Tue, 27 May 2014 10:40:44 +0000 (12:40 +0200)]
s390x/css: handle emw correctly for tsch
We should not try to store the emw portion of the irb if extended
measurements are not applicable. In particular, we should not surprise
the guest by storing a larger irb if it did not enable extended
measurements.
Cc: qemu-stable@nongnu.org Reviewed-by: David Hildenbrand <dahi@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Tested-by: Christian Borntraeger <borntraeger@de.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Cornelia Huck <cornelia.huck@de.ibm.com>
(cherry picked from commit f068d320def7fd83bf0fcdca37b305f1c2ac5413) Signed-off-by: Michael Roth <mdroth@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Peter Maydell [Mon, 9 Jun 2014 14:43:26 +0000 (15:43 +0100)]
target-arm: Fix errors in writes to generic timer control registers
The code for handling writes to the generic timer control registers
had several bugs:
* ISTATUS (bit 2) is read-only but we forced it to zero on any write
* the check for "was IMASK (bit 1) toggled?" incorrectly used '&' where
it should be '^'
* the handling of IMASK was inverted: we should set the IRQ if
ISTATUS is set and IMASK is clear, not if both are set
The combination of these bugs meant that when running a Linux guest
that uses the generic timers we would fairly quickly end up either
forgetting that the timer output should be asserted, or failing to
set the IRQ when the timer was unmasked. The result is that the guest
never gets any more timer interrupts.
Signed-off-by: Peter Maydell <peter.maydell@linaro.org>
Message-id: 1401803208-1281-1-git-send-email-peter.maydell@linaro.org Cc: qemu-stable@nongnu.org
(cherry picked from commit d3afacc7269fee45d54d1501a46b51f12ea7bb15) Signed-off-by: Michael Roth <mdroth@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
The first non-register argument isn't placed at offset 0.
Cc: qemu-stable@nongnu.org Reviewed-by: Stefan Weil <sw@weilnetz.de> Signed-off-by: Richard Henderson <rth@twiddle.net>
(cherry picked from commit 0b919667302aa395bfde0328749dc21a0b123c44) Signed-off-by: Michael Roth <mdroth@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Peter Maydell [Thu, 15 May 2014 13:40:23 +0000 (14:40 +0100)]
linux-user: Don't overrun guest buffer in sched_getaffinity
If the guest's "long" type is smaller than the host's, then
our sched_getaffinity wrapper needs to round the buffer size
up to a multiple of the host sizeof(long). This means that when
we copy the data back from the host buffer to the guest's
buffer there might be more than we can fit. Rather than
overflowing the guest's buffer, handle this case by returning
EINVAL or ignoring the unused extra space, as appropriate.
Note that only guests using the syscall interface directly might
run into this bug -- the glibc wrappers around it will always
use a buffer whose size is a multiple of 8 regardless of guest
architecture.
Signed-off-by: Peter Maydell <peter.maydell@linaro.org> Signed-off-by: Riku Voipio <riku.voipio@linaro.org>
(cherry picked from commit be3bd286bc06bb68cdc71748d9dd4edcd57b2b24) Signed-off-by: Michael Roth <mdroth@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Introduced in commit 661a0f7. Spotted by Coverity.
Signed-off-by: Markus Armbruster <armbru@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Benoit Canet <benoit@irqsave.net> Signed-off-by: Kevin Wolf <kwolf@redhat.com>
(cherry picked from commit bb9cd2ee99f6537c072d5f4bac441717d3cd2bed) Signed-off-by: Michael Roth <mdroth@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
block/sheepdog: Plug memory leak in sd_snapshot_create()
Has always been leaky. Spotted by Coverity.
Signed-off-by: Markus Armbruster <armbru@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Benoit Canet <benoit@irqsave.net> Signed-off-by: Kevin Wolf <kwolf@redhat.com>
(cherry picked from commit 2df5fee2dbd56a9c34afd6d7df6744da2d951ccb) Signed-off-by: Michael Roth <mdroth@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Markus Armbruster <armbru@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Benoit Canet <benoit@irqsave.net> Signed-off-by: Kevin Wolf <kwolf@redhat.com>
(cherry picked from commit b122c3b6d020e529b203836efb8f611ece787293) Signed-off-by: Michael Roth <mdroth@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
block/vvfat: Plug memory leak in check_directory_consistency()
On error path. Introduced in commit a046433a. Spotted by Coverity.
Signed-off-by: Markus Armbruster <armbru@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Benoit Canet <benoit@irqsave.net> Signed-off-by: Kevin Wolf <kwolf@redhat.com>
(cherry picked from commit 6262bbd363b53a1f19c473345d7cc40254dd5c73) Signed-off-by: Michael Roth <mdroth@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
block/qapi: Plug memory leak in dump_qobject() case QTYPE_QERROR
Introduced in commit a8d8ecb. Spotted by Coverity.
Signed-off-by: Markus Armbruster <armbru@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Benoit Canet <benoit@irqsave.net> Signed-off-by: Kevin Wolf <kwolf@redhat.com>
(cherry picked from commit f25391c2a6ef1674384204265429520ea50e82bc) Signed-off-by: Michael Roth <mdroth@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
bs_opts is leaked on all paths from its qdev_new() that don't got
through blockdev_init(). Add the missing QDECREF(), and zap bs_opts
after blockdev_init(), so the new QDECREF() does nothing when we go
through blockdev_init().
Leak introduced in commit f298d07. Spotted by Coverity.
Signed-off-by: Markus Armbruster <armbru@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Kevin Wolf <kwolf@redhat.com>
(cherry picked from commit 3cb0e25c4b417b7336816bd92de458f0770d49ff)
Conflicts:
blockdev.c
*fixed trivial context mismatch due to blockdev_init signature change
Signed-off-by: Michael Roth <mdroth@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
blockdev_init() leaks bs_opts when qemu_opts_create() fails, i.e. when
the ID is bad. Missed in commit ec9c10d.
Signed-off-by: Markus Armbruster <armbru@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Benoit Canet <benoit@irqsave.net> Signed-off-by: Kevin Wolf <kwolf@redhat.com>
(cherry picked from commit 6376f9522372d589f3efe60001dc0486237dd375) Signed-off-by: Michael Roth <mdroth@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Stefan Weil [Mon, 28 Apr 2014 17:20:00 +0000 (19:20 +0200)]
cputlb: Fix regression with TCG interpreter (bug 1310324)
Commit 0f842f8a246f2b5b51a11c13f933bf7a90ae8e96 replaced GETPC_EXT() which
was derived from GETPC() by GETRA_EXT() without fixing cputlb.c. A later
patch replaced GETRA_EXT() by GETRA() in exec/softmmu_template.h which
is included in cputlb.c.
The TCG interpreter failed because the values returned by GETRA() were no
longer explicitly set to 0. The redefinition of GETRA() introduced here
fixes this.
In addition, GETPC_ADJ which is also used in exec/softmmu_template.h is
set to 0. Both changes reduce the compiled code size for cputlb.c by more
than 100 bytes, so the normal TCG without interpreter also profits from
the reduced code size and slightly faster code.
Cc: qemu-stable@nongnu.org Reported-by: Giovanni Mascellani <gio@debian.org> Signed-off-by: Stefan Weil <sw@weilnetz.de> Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
(cherry picked from commit 7e4e88656c1e6192e9e47a2054d2dc190c1b840b) Signed-off-by: Michael Roth <mdroth@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Max Filippov [Tue, 20 May 2014 10:48:45 +0000 (14:48 +0400)]
target-xtensa: fix cross-page jumps/calls at the end of TB
Use tb->pc instead of dc->pc to check for cross-page jumps.
When TB translation stops at the page boundary dc->pc points to the next
page allowing chaining to TBs in it, which is wrong.
Cc: qemu-stable@nongnu.org Signed-off-by: Max Filippov <jcmvbkbc@gmail.com>
(cherry picked from commit 433d33c555deeed375996e338df1a9510df401c6) Signed-off-by: Michael Roth <mdroth@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
virtio-scsi: Plug memory leak on virtio_scsi_push_event() error path
Spotted by Coverity.
Signed-off-by: Markus Armbruster <armbru@redhat.com> Cc: qemu-stable@nongnu.org Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
(cherry picked from commit 91e7fcca4743cf694eb0c8e7a8d938cf359b5bd8) Signed-off-by: Michael Roth <mdroth@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Kevin Wolf [Thu, 8 May 2014 11:35:09 +0000 (13:35 +0200)]
qcow1: Stricter backing file length check
Like qcow2 since commit 6d33e8e7, error out on invalid lengths instead
of silently truncating them to 1023.
Also don't rely on bdrv_pread() catching integer overflows that make len
negative, but use unsigned variables in the first place.
Cc: qemu-stable@nongnu.org Signed-off-by: Kevin Wolf <kwolf@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Benoit Canet <benoit@irqsave.net>
(cherry picked from commit d66e5cee002c471b78139228a4e7012736b375f9) Signed-off-by: Michael Roth <mdroth@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Kevin Wolf [Thu, 8 May 2014 11:08:20 +0000 (13:08 +0200)]
qcow1: Validate image size (CVE-2014-0223)
A huge image size could cause s->l1_size to overflow. Make sure that
images never require a L1 table larger than what fits in s->l1_size.
This cannot only cause unbounded allocations, but also the allocation of
a too small L1 table, resulting in out-of-bounds array accesses (both
reads and writes).
Cc: qemu-stable@nongnu.org Signed-off-by: Kevin Wolf <kwolf@redhat.com>
(cherry picked from commit 46485de0cb357b57373e1ca895adedf1f3ed46ec) Signed-off-by: Michael Roth <mdroth@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Kevin Wolf [Thu, 15 May 2014 14:10:11 +0000 (16:10 +0200)]
qcow1: Validate L2 table size (CVE-2014-0222)
Too large L2 table sizes cause unbounded allocations. Images actually
created by qemu-img only have 512 byte or 4k L2 tables.
To keep things consistent with cluster sizes, allow ranges between 512
bytes and 64k (in fact, down to 1 entry = 8 bytes is technically
working, but L2 table sizes smaller than a cluster don't make a lot of
sense).
This also means that the number of bytes on the virtual disk that are
described by the same L2 table is limited to at most 8k * 64k or 2^29,
preventively avoiding any integer overflows.
Cc: qemu-stable@nongnu.org Signed-off-by: Kevin Wolf <kwolf@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Benoit Canet <benoit@irqsave.net>
(cherry picked from commit 42eb58179b3b215bb507da3262b682b8a2ec10b5) Signed-off-by: Michael Roth <mdroth@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Kevin Wolf [Wed, 7 May 2014 15:30:30 +0000 (17:30 +0200)]
qcow1: Check maximum cluster size
Huge values for header.cluster_bits cause unbounded allocations (e.g.
for s->cluster_cache) and crash qemu this way. Less huge values may
survive those allocations, but can cause integer overflows later on.
The only cluster sizes that qemu can create are 4k (for standalone
images) and 512 (for images with backing files), so we can limit it
to 64k.
Cc: qemu-stable@nongnu.org Signed-off-by: Kevin Wolf <kwolf@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Benoit Canet <benoit@irqsave.net>
(cherry picked from commit 7159a45b2bf2dcb9f49f1e27d1d3d135a0247a2f)
Conflicts:
block/qcow.c
tests/qemu-iotests/group
*removed mismatch due to error msgs from upstream's b6d5066d
*removed context from upstream block tests
Signed-off-by: Michael Roth <mdroth@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Kevin Wolf [Wed, 7 May 2014 14:56:10 +0000 (16:56 +0200)]
qcow1: Make padding in the header explicit
We were relying on all compilers inserting the same padding in the
header struct that is used for the on-disk format. Let's not do that.
Mark the struct as packed and insert an explicit padding field for
compatibility.
Cc: qemu-stable@nongnu.org Signed-off-by: Kevin Wolf <kwolf@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Benoit Canet <benoit@irqsave.net>
(cherry picked from commit ea54feff58efedc809641474b25a3130309678e7) Signed-off-by: Michael Roth <mdroth@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Kevin Wolf [Wed, 26 Mar 2014 12:06:09 +0000 (13:06 +0100)]
parallels: Sanity check for s->tracks (CVE-2014-0142)
This avoids a possible division by zero.
Convert s->tracks to unsigned as well because it feels better than
surviving just because the results of calculations with s->tracks are
converted to unsigned anyway.
Signed-off-by: Kevin Wolf <kwolf@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Max Reitz <mreitz@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Stefan Hajnoczi <stefanha@redhat.com>
(cherry picked from commit 9302e863aa8baa5d932fc078967050c055fa1a7f) Signed-off-by: Michael Roth <mdroth@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
The first test case would cause a huge memory allocation, leading to a
qemu abort; the second one to a too small malloc() for the catalog
(smaller than s->catalog_size), which causes a read-only out-of-bounds
array access and on big endian hosts an endianess conversion for an
undefined memory area.
The sample image used here is not an original Parallels image. It was
created using an hexeditor on the basis of the struct that qemu uses.
Good enough for trying to crash the driver, but not for ensuring
compatibility.
Signed-off-by: Kevin Wolf <kwolf@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Max Reitz <mreitz@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Stefan Hajnoczi <stefanha@redhat.com>
(cherry picked from commit afbcc40bee4ef51731102d7d4b499ee12fc182e1)
Conflicts:
tests/qemu-iotests/group
*fixed mismatches in group file
Signed-off-by: Michael Roth <mdroth@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Kevin Wolf [Wed, 26 Mar 2014 12:06:06 +0000 (13:06 +0100)]
qcow2: Check maximum L1 size in qcow2_snapshot_load_tmp() (CVE-2014-0143)
This avoids an unbounded allocation.
Signed-off-by: Kevin Wolf <kwolf@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Max Reitz <mreitz@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Stefan Hajnoczi <stefanha@redhat.com>
(cherry picked from commit 6a83f8b5bec6f59e56cc49bd49e4c3f8f805d56f) Signed-off-by: Michael Roth <mdroth@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Kevin Wolf [Wed, 26 Mar 2014 12:06:05 +0000 (13:06 +0100)]
qcow2: Fix L1 allocation size in qcow2_snapshot_load_tmp() (CVE-2014-0145)
For the L1 table to loaded for an internal snapshot, the code allocated
only enough memory to hold the currently active L1 table. If the
snapshot's L1 table is actually larger than the current one, this leads
to a buffer overflow.
Signed-off-by: Kevin Wolf <kwolf@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Max Reitz <mreitz@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Stefan Hajnoczi <stefanha@redhat.com>
(cherry picked from commit c05e4667be91b46ab42b5a11babf8e84d476cc6b) Signed-off-by: Michael Roth <mdroth@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Kevin Wolf [Wed, 26 Mar 2014 12:06:03 +0000 (13:06 +0100)]
qcow2: Fix copy_sectors() with VM state
bs->total_sectors is not the highest possible sector number that could
be involved in a copy on write operation: VM state is after the end of
the virtual disk. This resulted in wrong values for the number of
sectors to be copied (n).
The code that checks for the end of the image isn't required any more
because the code hasn't been calling the block layer's bdrv_read() for a
long time; instead, it directly calls qcow2_readv(), which doesn't error
out on VM state sector numbers.
Signed-off-by: Kevin Wolf <kwolf@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Max Reitz <mreitz@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Stefan Hajnoczi <stefanha@redhat.com>
(cherry picked from commit 6b7d4c55586a849aa8313282d79432917eade3bf) Signed-off-by: Michael Roth <mdroth@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Kevin Wolf [Wed, 26 Mar 2014 12:06:04 +0000 (13:06 +0100)]
qcow2: Fix NULL dereference in qcow2_open() error path (CVE-2014-0146)
The qcow2 code assumes that s->snapshots is non-NULL if s->nb_snapshots
!= 0. By having the initialisation of both fields separated in
qcow2_open(), any error occuring in between would cause the error path
to dereference NULL in qcow2_free_snapshots() if the image had any
snapshots.
Signed-off-by: Kevin Wolf <kwolf@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Max Reitz <mreitz@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Stefan Hajnoczi <stefanha@redhat.com>
(cherry picked from commit 11b128f4062dd7f89b14abc8877ff20d41b28be9) Signed-off-by: Michael Roth <mdroth@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Kevin Wolf [Wed, 26 Mar 2014 12:06:02 +0000 (13:06 +0100)]
block: Limit request size (CVE-2014-0143)
Limiting the size of a single request to INT_MAX not only fixes a
direct integer overflow in bdrv_check_request() (which would only
trigger bad behaviour with ridiculously huge images, as in close to
2^64 bytes), but can also prevent overflows in all block drivers.
Signed-off-by: Kevin Wolf <kwolf@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Max Reitz <mreitz@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Stefan Hajnoczi <stefanha@redhat.com>
(cherry picked from commit 8f4754ede56e3f9ea3fd7207f4a7c4453e59285b) Signed-off-by: Michael Roth <mdroth@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Both compressed and uncompressed I/O is buffered. dmg_open() calculates
the maximum buffer size needed from the metadata in the image file.
There is currently a buffer overflow since ->lengths[] is accounted
against the maximum compressed buffer size but actually uses the
uncompressed buffer:
switch (s->types[chunk]) {
case 1: /* copy */
ret = bdrv_pread(bs->file, s->offsets[chunk],
s->uncompressed_chunk, s->lengths[chunk]);
We must account against the maximum uncompressed buffer size for type=1
chunks.
This patch fixes the maximum buffer size calculation to take into
account the chunk type. It is critical that we update the correct
maximum since there are two buffers ->compressed_chunk and
->uncompressed_chunk.
Signed-off-by: Stefan Hajnoczi <stefanha@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Kevin Wolf <kwolf@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Max Reitz <mreitz@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Stefan Hajnoczi <stefanha@redhat.com>
(cherry picked from commit f0dce23475b5af5da6b17b97c1765271307734b6) Signed-off-by: Michael Roth <mdroth@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Stefan Hajnoczi [Wed, 26 Mar 2014 12:05:59 +0000 (13:05 +0100)]
dmg: use uint64_t consistently for sectors and lengths
The DMG metadata is stored as uint64_t, so use the same type for
sector_num. int was a particularly poor choice since it is only 32-bit
and would truncate large values.
Signed-off-by: Stefan Hajnoczi <stefanha@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Kevin Wolf <kwolf@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Max Reitz <mreitz@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Stefan Hajnoczi <stefanha@redhat.com>
(cherry picked from commit 686d7148ec23402a172628c800022b3a95a022c9) Signed-off-by: Michael Roth <mdroth@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Stefan Hajnoczi [Wed, 26 Mar 2014 12:05:58 +0000 (13:05 +0100)]
dmg: sanitize chunk length and sectorcount (CVE-2014-0145)
Chunk length and sectorcount are used for decompression buffers as well
as the bdrv_pread() count argument. Ensure that they have reasonable
values so neither memory allocation nor conversion from uint64_t to int
will cause problems.
Signed-off-by: Stefan Hajnoczi <stefanha@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Kevin Wolf <kwolf@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Max Reitz <mreitz@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Stefan Hajnoczi <stefanha@redhat.com>
(cherry picked from commit c165f7758009a4f793c1fc19ebb69cf55313450b) Signed-off-by: Michael Roth <mdroth@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Stefan Hajnoczi [Wed, 26 Mar 2014 12:05:57 +0000 (13:05 +0100)]
dmg: use appropriate types when reading chunks
Use the right types instead of signed int:
size_t new_size;
This is a byte count for g_realloc() that is calculated from uint32_t
and size_t values.
uint32_t chunk_count;
Use the same type as s->n_chunks, which is used together with
chunk_count.
This patch is a cleanup and does not fix bugs.
Signed-off-by: Stefan Hajnoczi <stefanha@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Kevin Wolf <kwolf@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Max Reitz <mreitz@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Stefan Hajnoczi <stefanha@redhat.com>
(cherry picked from commit eb71803b041f55779ea10d860c0f66df285c68de) Signed-off-by: Michael Roth <mdroth@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Stefan Hajnoczi [Wed, 26 Mar 2014 12:05:56 +0000 (13:05 +0100)]
dmg: drop broken bdrv_pread() loop
It is not necessary to check errno for EINTR and the block layer does
not produce short reads. Therefore we can drop the loop that attempts
to read a compressed chunk.
The loop is buggy because it incorrectly adds the transferred bytes
twice:
do {
ret = bdrv_pread(...);
i += ret;
} while (ret >= 0 && ret + i < s->lengths[chunk]);
Luckily we can drop the loop completely and perform a single
bdrv_pread().
Signed-off-by: Stefan Hajnoczi <stefanha@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Kevin Wolf <kwolf@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Max Reitz <mreitz@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Stefan Hajnoczi <stefanha@redhat.com>
(cherry picked from commit b404bf854217dbe8a5649449eb3ad33777f7d900) Signed-off-by: Michael Roth <mdroth@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Stefan Hajnoczi [Wed, 26 Mar 2014 12:05:55 +0000 (13:05 +0100)]
dmg: prevent out-of-bounds array access on terminator
When a terminator is reached the base for offsets and sectors is stored.
The following records that are processed will use this base value.
If the first record we encounter is a terminator, then calculating the
base values would result in out-of-bounds array accesses. Don't do
that.
Signed-off-by: Stefan Hajnoczi <stefanha@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Kevin Wolf <kwolf@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Max Reitz <mreitz@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Stefan Hajnoczi <stefanha@redhat.com>
(cherry picked from commit 73ed27ec28a1dbebdd2ae792284151f029950fbe) Signed-off-by: Michael Roth <mdroth@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Stefan Hajnoczi [Wed, 26 Mar 2014 12:05:54 +0000 (13:05 +0100)]
dmg: coding style and indentation cleanup
Clean up the mix of tabs and spaces, as well as the coding style
violations in block/dmg.c. There are no semantic changes since this
patch simply reformats the code.
This patch is necessary before we can make meaningful changes to this
file, due to the inconsistent formatting and confusing indentation.
Signed-off-by: Stefan Hajnoczi <stefanha@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Kevin Wolf <kwolf@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Max Reitz <mreitz@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Stefan Hajnoczi <stefanha@redhat.com>
(cherry picked from commit 2c1885adcf0312da80c7317b09f9adad97fa0fc6) Signed-off-by: Michael Roth <mdroth@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Kevin Wolf [Wed, 26 Mar 2014 12:05:53 +0000 (13:05 +0100)]
qcow2: Fix new L1 table size check (CVE-2014-0143)
The size in bytes is assigned to an int later, so check that instead of
the number of entries.
Signed-off-by: Kevin Wolf <kwolf@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Max Reitz <mreitz@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Stefan Hajnoczi <stefanha@redhat.com>
(cherry picked from commit cab60de930684c33f67d4e32c7509b567f8c445b) Signed-off-by: Michael Roth <mdroth@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Kevin Wolf [Wed, 26 Mar 2014 12:05:52 +0000 (13:05 +0100)]
qcow2: Protect against some integer overflows in bdrv_check
Signed-off-by: Kevin Wolf <kwolf@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Max Reitz <mreitz@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Stefan Hajnoczi <stefanha@redhat.com>
(cherry picked from commit 0abe740f1de899737242bcba1fb4a9857f7a3087) Signed-off-by: Michael Roth <mdroth@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Kevin Wolf [Wed, 26 Mar 2014 12:05:51 +0000 (13:05 +0100)]
qcow2: Fix types in qcow2_alloc_clusters and alloc_clusters_noref
In order to avoid integer overflows.
Signed-off-by: Kevin Wolf <kwolf@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Max Reitz <mreitz@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Stefan Hajnoczi <stefanha@redhat.com>
(cherry picked from commit bb572aefbdac290363bfa5ca0e810ccce0a14ed6) Signed-off-by: Michael Roth <mdroth@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Kevin Wolf [Wed, 26 Mar 2014 12:05:50 +0000 (13:05 +0100)]
qcow2: Check new refcount table size on growth
If the size becomes larger than what qcow2_open() would accept, fail the
growing operation.
Signed-off-by: Kevin Wolf <kwolf@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Max Reitz <mreitz@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Stefan Hajnoczi <stefanha@redhat.com>
(cherry picked from commit 2b5d5953eec0cc541857c3df812bdf8421596ab2) Signed-off-by: Michael Roth <mdroth@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Kevin Wolf [Wed, 26 Mar 2014 12:05:49 +0000 (13:05 +0100)]
qcow2: Avoid integer overflow in get_refcount (CVE-2014-0143)
This ensures that the checks catch all invalid cluster indexes
instead of returning the refcount of a wrong cluster.
Signed-off-by: Kevin Wolf <kwolf@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Max Reitz <mreitz@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Stefan Hajnoczi <stefanha@redhat.com>
(cherry picked from commit db8a31d11d6a60f48d6817530640d75aa72a9a2f) Signed-off-by: Michael Roth <mdroth@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Kevin Wolf [Fri, 28 Mar 2014 17:06:31 +0000 (18:06 +0100)]
qcow2: Don't rely on free_cluster_index in alloc_refcount_block() (CVE-2014-0147)
free_cluster_index is only correct if update_refcount() was called from
an allocation function, and even there it's brittle because it's used to
protect unfinished allocations which still have a refcount of 0 - if it
moves in the wrong place, the unfinished allocation can be corrupted.
So not using it any more seems to be a good idea. Instead, use the
first requested cluster to do the calculations. Return -EAGAIN if
unfinished allocations could become invalid and let the caller restart
its search for some free clusters.
The context of creating a snapsnot is one situation where
update_refcount() is called outside of a cluster allocation. For this
case, the change fixes a buffer overflow if a cluster is referenced in
an L2 table that cannot be represented by an existing refcount block.
(new_table[refcount_table_index] was out of bounds)
[Bump the qemu-iotests 026 refblock_alloc.write leak count from 10 to
11.
--Stefan]
Signed-off-by: Kevin Wolf <kwolf@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Max Reitz <mreitz@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Stefan Hajnoczi <stefanha@redhat.com>
(cherry picked from commit b106ad9185f35fc4ad669555ad0e79e276083bd7) Signed-off-by: Michael Roth <mdroth@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Kevin Wolf [Wed, 4 Dec 2013 10:06:36 +0000 (11:06 +0100)]
qcow2: Zero-initialise first cluster for new images
Strictly speaking, this is only required for has_zero_init() == false,
but it's easy enough to just do a cluster-aligned write that is padded
with zeros after the header.
This fixes that after 'qemu-img create' header extensions are attempted
to be parsed that are really just random leftover data.
Cc: qemu-stable@nongnu.org Signed-off-by: Kevin Wolf <kwolf@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Fam Zheng <famz@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Stefan Hajnoczi <stefanha@redhat.com>
(cherry picked from commit f8413b3c23b08a547ce18609acc6fae5fd04ed5c) Signed-off-by: Michael Roth <mdroth@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Hu Tao [Sun, 26 Jan 2014 03:12:38 +0000 (11:12 +0800)]
qcow2: fix offset overflow in qcow2_alloc_clusters_at()
When cluster size is big enough it can lead to an offset overflow
in qcow2_alloc_clusters_at(). This patch fixes it.
The allocation is stopped each time at L2 table boundary
(see handle_alloc()), so the possible maximum bytes could be
2^(cluster_bits - 3 + cluster_bits)
cluster_bits - 3 is used to compute the number of entry by L2
and the additional cluster_bits is to take into account each
clusters referenced by the L2 entries.
so int is safe for cluster_bits<=17, unsafe otherwise.
Signed-off-by: Hu Tao <hutao@cn.fujitsu.com> Reviewed-by: Max Reitz <mreitz@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Benoit Canet <benoit@irqsave.net> Signed-off-by: Kevin Wolf <kwolf@redhat.com>
(cherry picked from commit 33304ec9fa484e765c6249673e09e1b7d49c5b85) Signed-off-by: Michael Roth <mdroth@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Kevin Wolf [Wed, 26 Mar 2014 12:05:47 +0000 (13:05 +0100)]
qcow2: Fix backing file name length check
len could become negative and would pass the check then. Nothing bad
happened because bdrv_pread() happens to return an error for negative
length values, but make variables for sizes unsigned anyway.
This patch also changes the behaviour to error out on invalid lengths
instead of silently truncating it to 1023.
Signed-off-by: Kevin Wolf <kwolf@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Max Reitz <mreitz@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Stefan Hajnoczi <stefanha@redhat.com>
(cherry picked from commit 6d33e8e7dc9d40ea105feed4b39caa3e641569e8) Signed-off-by: Michael Roth <mdroth@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Kevin Wolf [Wed, 26 Mar 2014 12:05:46 +0000 (13:05 +0100)]
qcow2: Validate active L1 table offset and size (CVE-2014-0144)
This avoids an unbounded allocation.
Signed-off-by: Kevin Wolf <kwolf@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Max Reitz <mreitz@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Stefan Hajnoczi <stefanha@redhat.com>
(cherry picked from commit 2d51c32c4b511db8bb9e58208f1e2c25e4c06c85) Signed-off-by: Michael Roth <mdroth@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
This avoid unbounded memory allocation and fixes a potential buffer
overflow on 32 bit hosts.
Signed-off-by: Kevin Wolf <kwolf@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Max Reitz <mreitz@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Stefan Hajnoczi <stefanha@redhat.com>
(cherry picked from commit ce48f2f441ca98885267af6fd636a7cb804ee646) Signed-off-by: Michael Roth <mdroth@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Kevin Wolf [Wed, 26 Mar 2014 12:05:44 +0000 (13:05 +0100)]
qcow2: Validate refcount table offset
The end of the refcount table must not exceed INT64_MAX so that integer
overflows are avoided.
Also check for misaligned refcount table. Such images are invalid and
probably the result of data corruption. Error out to avoid further
corruption.
Signed-off-by: Kevin Wolf <kwolf@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Max Reitz <mreitz@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Stefan Hajnoczi <stefanha@redhat.com>
(cherry picked from commit 8c7de28305a514d7f879fdfc677ca11fbf60d2e9) Signed-off-by: Michael Roth <mdroth@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Kevin Wolf [Wed, 26 Mar 2014 12:05:43 +0000 (13:05 +0100)]
qcow2: Check refcount table size (CVE-2014-0144)
Limit the in-memory reference count table size to 8 MB, it's enough in
practice. This fixes an unbounded allocation as well as a buffer
overflow in qcow2_refcount_init().
Signed-off-by: Kevin Wolf <kwolf@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Max Reitz <mreitz@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Stefan Hajnoczi <stefanha@redhat.com>
(cherry picked from commit 5dab2faddc8eaa1fb1abdbe2f502001fc13a1b21) Signed-off-by: Michael Roth <mdroth@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Kevin Wolf [Wed, 26 Mar 2014 12:05:42 +0000 (13:05 +0100)]
qcow2: Check backing_file_offset (CVE-2014-0144)
Header, header extension and the backing file name must all be stored in
the first cluster. Setting the backing file to a much higher value
allowed header extensions to become much bigger than we want them to be
(unbounded allocation).
Signed-off-by: Kevin Wolf <kwolf@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Max Reitz <mreitz@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Stefan Hajnoczi <stefanha@redhat.com>
(cherry picked from commit a1b3955c9415b1e767c130a2f59fee6aa28e575b) Signed-off-by: Michael Roth <mdroth@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Kevin Wolf [Wed, 26 Mar 2014 12:05:41 +0000 (13:05 +0100)]
qcow2: Check header_length (CVE-2014-0144)
This fixes an unbounded allocation for s->unknown_header_fields.
Signed-off-by: Kevin Wolf <kwolf@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Max Reitz <mreitz@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Stefan Hajnoczi <stefanha@redhat.com>
(cherry picked from commit 24342f2cae47d03911e346fe1e520b00dc2818e0)
Conflicts:
tests/qemu-iotests/group
*fixed context mismatches in group file
Signed-off-by: Michael Roth <mdroth@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Fam Zheng [Wed, 26 Mar 2014 12:05:40 +0000 (13:05 +0100)]
curl: check data size before memcpy to local buffer. (CVE-2014-0144)
curl_read_cb is callback function for libcurl when data arrives. The
data size passed in here is not guaranteed to be within the range of
request we submitted, so we may overflow the guest IO buffer. Check the
real size we have before memcpy to buffer to avoid overflow.
Signed-off-by: Fam Zheng <famz@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Stefan Hajnoczi <stefanha@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Kevin Wolf <kwolf@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Max Reitz <mreitz@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Stefan Hajnoczi <stefanha@redhat.com>
(cherry picked from commit 6d4b9e55fc625514a38d27cff4b9933f617fa7dc) Signed-off-by: Michael Roth <mdroth@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Jeff Cody [Wed, 26 Mar 2014 12:05:39 +0000 (13:05 +0100)]
vhdx: Bounds checking for block_size and logical_sector_size (CVE-2014-0148)
Other variables (e.g. sectors_per_block) are calculated using these
variables, and if not range-checked illegal values could be obtained
causing infinite loops and other potential issues when calculating
BAT entries.
The 1.00 VHDX spec requires BlockSize to be min 1MB, max 256MB.
LogicalSectorSize is required to be either 512 or 4096 bytes.
Reported-by: Kevin Wolf <kwolf@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Jeff Cody <jcody@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Kevin Wolf <kwolf@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Max Reitz <mreitz@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Stefan Hajnoczi <stefanha@redhat.com>
(cherry picked from commit 1d7678dec4761acdc43439da6ceda41a703ba1a6) Signed-off-by: Michael Roth <mdroth@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Jeff Cody [Fri, 28 Mar 2014 15:42:24 +0000 (11:42 -0400)]
vdi: add bounds checks for blocks_in_image and disk_size header fields (CVE-2014-0144)
The maximum blocks_in_image is 0xffffffff / 4, which also limits the
maximum disk_size for a VDI image to 1024TB. Note that this is the maximum
size that QEMU will currently support with this driver, not necessarily the
maximum size allowed by the image format.
Signed-off-by: Jeff Cody <jcody@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Kevin Wolf <kwolf@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Stefan Hajnoczi <stefanha@redhat.com>
(cherry picked from commit 63fa06dc978f3669dbfd9443b33cde9e2a7f4b41)
Conflicts:
block/vdi.c
*modified to retain 1.7's usage of logout() over error_setg()
Signed-off-by: Michael Roth <mdroth@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Kevin Wolf [Wed, 26 Mar 2014 12:05:37 +0000 (13:05 +0100)]
vpc: Validate block size (CVE-2014-0142)
This fixes some cases of division by zero crashes.
Signed-off-by: Kevin Wolf <kwolf@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Max Reitz <mreitz@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Stefan Hajnoczi <stefanha@redhat.com>
(cherry picked from commit 5e71dfad763d67bb64be79e20e93411c0c30ad25)
Conflicts:
tests/qemu-iotests/group
*fixed context mismatches in group file
Signed-off-by: Michael Roth <mdroth@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Jeff Cody [Wed, 26 Mar 2014 12:05:36 +0000 (13:05 +0100)]
vpc/vhd: add bounds check for max_table_entries and block_size (CVE-2014-0144)
This adds checks to make sure that max_table_entries and block_size
are in sane ranges. Memory is allocated based on max_table_entries,
and block_size is used to calculate indices into that allocated
memory, so if these values are incorrect that can lead to potential
unbounded memory allocation, or invalid memory accesses.
Also, the allocation of the pagetable is changed from g_malloc0()
to qemu_blockalign().
Signed-off-by: Jeff Cody <jcody@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Kevin Wolf <kwolf@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Max Reitz <mreitz@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Stefan Hajnoczi <stefanha@redhat.com>
(cherry picked from commit 97f1c45c6f456572e5b504b8614e4a69e23b8e3a) Signed-off-by: Michael Roth <mdroth@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Kevin Wolf [Wed, 26 Mar 2014 12:05:35 +0000 (13:05 +0100)]
bochs: Fix bitmap offset calculation
32 bit truncation could let us access the wrong offset in the image.
Signed-off-by: Kevin Wolf <kwolf@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Stefan Hajnoczi <stefanha@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Max Reitz <mreitz@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Stefan Hajnoczi <stefanha@redhat.com>
(cherry picked from commit a9ba36a45dfac645a810c31ce15ab393b69d820a) Signed-off-by: Michael Roth <mdroth@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Kevin Wolf [Wed, 26 Mar 2014 12:05:34 +0000 (13:05 +0100)]
bochs: Check extent_size header field (CVE-2014-0142)
This fixes two possible division by zero crashes: In bochs_open() and in
seek_to_sector().
Signed-off-by: Kevin Wolf <kwolf@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Stefan Hajnoczi <stefanha@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Max Reitz <mreitz@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Stefan Hajnoczi <stefanha@redhat.com>
(cherry picked from commit 8e53abbc20d08ae3ec30c2054e1161314ad9501d) Signed-off-by: Michael Roth <mdroth@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Kevin Wolf [Wed, 26 Mar 2014 12:05:33 +0000 (13:05 +0100)]
bochs: Check catalog_size header field (CVE-2014-0143)
It should neither become negative nor allow unbounded memory
allocations. This fixes aborts in g_malloc() and an s->catalog_bitmap
buffer overflow on big endian hosts.
Signed-off-by: Kevin Wolf <kwolf@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Stefan Hajnoczi <stefanha@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Max Reitz <mreitz@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Stefan Hajnoczi <stefanha@redhat.com>
(cherry picked from commit e3737b820b45e54b059656dc3f914f895ac7a88b) Signed-off-by: Michael Roth <mdroth@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Kevin Wolf [Wed, 26 Mar 2014 12:05:32 +0000 (13:05 +0100)]
bochs: Use unsigned variables for offsets and sizes (CVE-2014-0147)
Gets us rid of integer overflows resulting in negative sizes which
aren't correctly checked.
Signed-off-by: Kevin Wolf <kwolf@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Stefan Hajnoczi <stefanha@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Max Reitz <mreitz@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Stefan Hajnoczi <stefanha@redhat.com>
(cherry picked from commit 246f65838d19db6db55bfb41117c35645a2c4789) Signed-off-by: Michael Roth <mdroth@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Kevin Wolf [Wed, 26 Mar 2014 12:05:31 +0000 (13:05 +0100)]
bochs: Unify header structs and make them QEMU_PACKED
This is an on-disk structure, so offsets must be accurate.
Before this patch, sizeof(bochs) != sizeof(header_v1), which makes the
memcpy() between both invalid. We're lucky enough that the destination
buffer happened to be the larger one, and the memcpy size to be taken
from the smaller one, so we didn't get a buffer overflow in practice.
This patch unifies the both structures, eliminating the need to do a
memcpy in the first place. The common fields are extracted to the top
level of the struct and the actually differing part gets a union of the
two versions.
Signed-off-by: Kevin Wolf <kwolf@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Stefan Hajnoczi <stefanha@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Max Reitz <mreitz@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Stefan Hajnoczi <stefanha@redhat.com>
(cherry picked from commit 3dd8a6763bcc50dfc3de8da9279b741c0dea9fb1) Signed-off-by: Michael Roth <mdroth@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Kevin Wolf [Wed, 26 Mar 2014 12:05:30 +0000 (13:05 +0100)]
qemu-iotests: Support for bochs format
Signed-off-by: Kevin Wolf <kwolf@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Stefan Hajnoczi <stefanha@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Max Reitz <mreitz@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Stefan Hajnoczi <stefanha@redhat.com>
(cherry picked from commit 24f3078a049c52070adfc659fc3a1a71a11a7765)
Conflicts:
tests/qemu-iotests/group
*fix context mismatches in group file
Signed-off-by: Michael Roth <mdroth@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Stefan Hajnoczi [Wed, 26 Mar 2014 12:05:29 +0000 (13:05 +0100)]
block/cloop: fix offsets[] size off-by-one
cloop stores the number of compressed blocks in the n_blocks header
field. The file actually contains n_blocks + 1 offsets, where the extra
offset is the end-of-file offset.
The following line in cloop_read_block() results in an out-of-bounds
offsets[] access:
This patch allocates and loads the extra offset so that
cloop_read_block() works correctly when the last block is accessed.
Notice that we must free s->offsets[] unconditionally now since there is
always an end-of-file offset.
Signed-off-by: Stefan Hajnoczi <stefanha@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Kevin Wolf <kwolf@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Max Reitz <mreitz@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Stefan Hajnoczi <stefanha@redhat.com>
(cherry picked from commit 42d43d35d907579179a39c924d169da924786f65) Signed-off-by: Michael Roth <mdroth@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Stefan Hajnoczi [Wed, 26 Mar 2014 12:05:28 +0000 (13:05 +0100)]
block/cloop: refuse images with bogus offsets (CVE-2014-0144)
The offsets[] array allows efficient seeking and tells us the maximum
compressed data size. If the offsets are bogus the maximum compressed
data size will be unrealistic.
This could cause g_malloc() to abort and bogus offsets mean the image is
broken anyway. Therefore we should refuse such images.
Signed-off-by: Stefan Hajnoczi <stefanha@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Kevin Wolf <kwolf@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Max Reitz <mreitz@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Stefan Hajnoczi <stefanha@redhat.com>
(cherry picked from commit f56b9bc3ae20fc93815b34aa022be919941406ce) Signed-off-by: Michael Roth <mdroth@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Stefan Hajnoczi [Wed, 26 Mar 2014 12:05:27 +0000 (13:05 +0100)]
block/cloop: refuse images with huge offsets arrays (CVE-2014-0144)
Limit offsets_size to 512 MB so that:
1. g_malloc() does not abort due to an unreasonable size argument.
2. offsets_size does not overflow the bdrv_pread() int size argument.
This limit imposes a maximum image size of 16 TB at 256 KB block size.
Signed-off-by: Stefan Hajnoczi <stefanha@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Kevin Wolf <kwolf@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Max Reitz <mreitz@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Stefan Hajnoczi <stefanha@redhat.com>
(cherry picked from commit 7b103b36d6ef3b11827c203d3a793bf7da50ecd6) Signed-off-by: Michael Roth <mdroth@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
offsets_size can be smaller than n_blocks due to integer overflow.
Therefore s->offsets[] is too small when the for loop byteswaps offsets.
This patch refuses to open files if offsets_size would overflow.
Note that changing the type of offsets_size is not a fix since 32-bit
hosts still only have 32-bit size_t.
Signed-off-by: Stefan Hajnoczi <stefanha@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Kevin Wolf <kwolf@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Max Reitz <mreitz@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Stefan Hajnoczi <stefanha@redhat.com>
(cherry picked from commit 509a41bab5306181044b5fff02eadf96d9c8676a) Signed-off-by: Michael Roth <mdroth@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Stefan Hajnoczi [Wed, 26 Mar 2014 12:05:25 +0000 (13:05 +0100)]
block/cloop: validate block_size header field (CVE-2014-0144)
Avoid unbounded s->uncompressed_block memory allocation by checking that
the block_size header field has a reasonable value. Also enforce the
assumption that the value is a non-zero multiple of 512.
These constraints conform to cloop 2.639's code so we accept existing
image files.
Signed-off-by: Stefan Hajnoczi <stefanha@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Kevin Wolf <kwolf@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Max Reitz <mreitz@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Stefan Hajnoczi <stefanha@redhat.com>
(cherry picked from commit d65f97a82c4ed48374a764c769d4ba1ea9724e97) Signed-off-by: Michael Roth <mdroth@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Stefan Hajnoczi [Wed, 26 Mar 2014 12:05:24 +0000 (13:05 +0100)]
qemu-iotests: add cloop input validation tests
Add a cloop format-specific test case. Later patches add tests for
input validation to the script.
Signed-off-by: Stefan Hajnoczi <stefanha@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Kevin Wolf <kwolf@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Max Reitz <mreitz@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Stefan Hajnoczi <stefanha@redhat.com>
(cherry picked from commit 05560fcebb1528f4354f6f24d1eb8cdbcdf2c4b2)
Conflicts:
tests/qemu-iotests/group
*fixed context mismatches in group file
Signed-off-by: Michael Roth <mdroth@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Stefan Hajnoczi [Wed, 26 Mar 2014 12:05:23 +0000 (13:05 +0100)]
qemu-iotests: add ./check -cloop support
Add the cloop block driver to qemu-iotests.
Signed-off-by: Stefan Hajnoczi <stefanha@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Kevin Wolf <kwolf@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Max Reitz <mreitz@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Stefan Hajnoczi <stefanha@redhat.com>
(cherry picked from commit 47f73da0a7d36e399eaa353d93afce90de9b599d) Signed-off-by: Michael Roth <mdroth@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Peter Lieven [Tue, 10 Jun 2014 09:29:16 +0000 (11:29 +0200)]
migration: catch unknown flags in ram_load
if a saved vm has unknown flags in the memory data qemu
currently simply ignores this flag and continues which
yields in an unpredictable result.
This patch catches all unknown flags and aborts the
loading of the vm. Additionally error reports are thrown
if the migration aborts abnormally.
Signed-off-by: Peter Lieven <pl@kamp.de> Signed-off-by: Juan Quintela <quintela@redhat.com>
(cherry picked from commit db80facefa62dff42bb50c73b0f03eda5f732b49)
It's a loop from i < num_sg and the array is VIRTQUEUE_MAX_SIZE - so
it's OK if the value read is VIRTQUEUE_MAX_SIZE.
Not a big problem in practice as people don't use
such big queues, but it's inelegant.
Reported-by: "Dr. David Alan Gilbert" <dgilbert@redhat.com> Cc: qemu-stable@nongnu.org Signed-off-by: Michael S. Tsirkin <mst@redhat.com>
(cherry picked from commit 937251408051e0489f78e4db3c92e045b147b38b) Signed-off-by: Michael Roth <mdroth@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
KVM only supports MSIX table size up to 256 vectors,
but some assigned devices support more vectors,
at the moment attempts to assign them fail with EINVAL.
Tweak the MSIX capability exposed to guest to limit table size
to a supported value.
Signed-off-by: Michael S. Tsirkin <mst@redhat.com> Tested-by: Gonglei <arei.gonglei@huawei.com> Cc: qemu-stable@nongnu.org Acked-by: Alex Williamson <alex.williamson@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
(cherry picked from commit 639973a4740f38789057744b550df3a175bc49ad) Signed-off-by: Michael Roth <mdroth@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
spapr_pci: Fix number of returned vectors in ibm, change-msi
Current guest kernels try allocating as many vectors as the quota is.
For example, in the case of virtio-net (which has just 3 vectors)
the guest requests 4 vectors (that is the quota in the test) and
the existing ibm,change-msi handler returns 4. But before it returns,
it calls msix_set_message() in a loop and corrupts memory behind
the end of msix_table.
This limits the number of vectors returned by ibm,change-msi to
the maximum supported by the actual device.
Signed-off-by: Alexey Kardashevskiy <aik@ozlabs.ru> Cc: qemu-stable@nongnu.org
[agraf: squash in bugfix from aik] Signed-off-by: Alexander Graf <agraf@suse.de>
(cherry picked from commit b26696b519f853c9844e5154858e583600ee3cdc)
*s/error_report/fprintf/ to reflect v1.7.x error reporting style
Signed-off-by: Michael Roth <mdroth@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Peter Maydell [Fri, 2 May 2014 13:45:14 +0000 (14:45 +0100)]
linux-user/elfload.c: Fix A64 code which was incorrectly acting like A32
The ARM target-specific code in elfload.c was incorrectly allowing
the 64-bit ARM target to use most of the existing 32-bit definitions:
most noticably this meant that our HWCAP bits passed to the guest
were wrong, and register handling when dumping core was totally
broken. Fix this by properly separating the 64 and 32 bit code,
since they have more differences than similarities.
Signed-off-by: Peter Maydell <peter.maydell@linaro.org> Cc: qemu-stable@nongnu.org Signed-off-by: Riku Voipio <riku.voipio@linaro.org>
(cherry picked from commit 24e76ff06bcd0936ee8b04b15dca42efb7d614d1)
Conflicts:
linux-user/elfload.c
Signed-off-by: Michael Roth <mdroth@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Peter Maydell [Fri, 2 May 2014 13:45:13 +0000 (14:45 +0100)]
linux-user/elfload.c: Update ARM HWCAP bits
The kernel has added support for a number of new ARM HWCAP bits;
add them to QEMU, including support for setting them where we have
a corresponding CPU feature bit.
We were also incorrectly setting the VFPv3D16 HWCAP -- this means
"only 16 D registers", not "supports 16-bit floating point format";
since QEMU always has 32 D registers for VFPv3, we can just remove
the line that incorrectly set this bit.
The kernel does not set the HWCAP_FPA even if it is providing FPA
emulation via nwfpe, so don't set this bit in QEMU either.
Signed-off-by: Peter Maydell <peter.maydell@linaro.org> Cc: qemu-stable@nongnu.org Signed-off-by: Riku Voipio <riku.voipio@linaro.org>
(cherry picked from commit 24682654654a2e7b50afc27880f4098e5fca3742) Signed-off-by: Michael Roth <mdroth@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Peter Maydell [Fri, 2 May 2014 13:45:12 +0000 (14:45 +0100)]
linux-user/elfload.c: Fix incorrect ARM HWCAP bits
The ELF HWCAP bits for ARM features THUMBEE, NEON, VFPv3 and VFPv3D16 are
all off by one compared to the kernel definitions. Fix this discrepancy
and add in the missing CRUNCH bit which was the cause of the off-by-one
error. (We don't emulate any of the CPUs which have that weird hardware,
so it's otherwise uninteresting to us.)
Cc: qemu-stable@nongnu.org Signed-off-by: Peter Maydell <peter.maydell@linaro.org> Signed-off-by: Riku Voipio <riku.voipio@linaro.org>
(cherry picked from commit 43ce393ee5f7b96d2ac22fedc40d6b6fb3f65a3e) Signed-off-by: Michael Roth <mdroth@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
target-arm: Make vbar_write 64bit friendly on 32bit hosts
Signed-off-by: Edgar E. Iglesias <edgar.iglesias@xilinx.com> Reviewed-by: Alex Bennée <alex.bennee@linaro.org>
Message-id: 1398926097-28097-2-git-send-email-edgar.iglesias@gmail.com Signed-off-by: Peter Maydell <peter.maydell@linaro.org>
(cherry picked from commit fed3ffb9f157f33bc9b2b1c3ef68e710ee6b7b4b)
Conflicts:
target-arm/helper.c
Signed-off-by: Michael Roth <mdroth@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Paolo Bonzini [Tue, 29 Apr 2014 11:10:05 +0000 (13:10 +0200)]
target-i386: fix set of registers zeroed on reset
BND0-3, BNDCFGU, BNDCFGS, BNDSTATUS were not zeroed on reset, but they
should be (Intel Instruction Set Extensions Programming Reference
319433-015, pages 9-4 and 9-6). Same for YMM.
XCR0 should be reset to 1.
TSC and TSC_RESET were zeroed already by the memset, remove the explicit
assignments.
Cc: Andreas Faerber <afaerber@suse.de> Reviewed-by: Michael S. Tsirkin <mst@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
(cherry picked from commit 05e7e819d7d159a75a46354aead95e1199b8f168)
Incoming migration with stellaris_enet is unsafe.
It's being reworked, but for now, simply block it
since noone is using it anyway.
Block outgoing migration for good measure.
CVE-2013-4532
Signed-off-by: Michael S. Tsirkin <mst@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Michael Roth <mdroth@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Malformed input can have config_len in migration stream
exceed the array size allocated on destination, the
result will be heap overflow.
To fix, that config_len matches on both sides.
CVE-2014-0182
Reported-by: "Dr. David Alan Gilbert" <dgilbert@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Michael S. Tsirkin <mst@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Juan Quintela <quintela@redhat.com>
--
v2: use %ix and %zx to print config_len values Signed-off-by: Juan Quintela <quintela@redhat.com>
(cherry picked from commit a890a2f9137ac3cf5b607649e66a6f3a5512d8dc) Signed-off-by: Michael Roth <mdroth@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Peter Maydell [Thu, 3 Apr 2014 16:52:28 +0000 (19:52 +0300)]
savevm: Ignore minimum_version_id_old if there is no load_state_old
At the moment we require vmstate definitions to set minimum_version_id_old
to the same value as minimum_version_id if they do not provide a
load_state_old handler. Since the load_state_old functionality is
required only for a handful of devices that need to retain migration
compatibility with a pre-vmstate implementation, this means the bulk
of devices have pointless boilerplate. Relax the definition so that
minimum_version_id_old is ignored if there is no load_state_old handler.
Note that under the old scheme we would segfault if the vmstate
specified a minimum_version_id_old that was less than minimum_version_id
but did not provide a load_state_old function, and the incoming state
specified a version number between minimum_version_id_old and
minimum_version_id. Under the new scheme this will just result in
our failing the migration.
Signed-off-by: Peter Maydell <peter.maydell@linaro.org> Reviewed-by: Michael S. Tsirkin <mst@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Michael S. Tsirkin <mst@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Juan Quintela <quintela@redhat.com>
(cherry picked from commit 767adce2d9cd397de3418caa16be35ea18d56f22)
Conflicts:
vmstate.c
*removed dependency on b6fcfa59 (Move VMState code to vmstate.c)
Signed-off-by: Michael Roth <mdroth@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
usb: sanity check setup_index+setup_len in post_load
CVE-2013-4541
s->setup_len and s->setup_index are fed into usb_packet_copy as
size/offset into s->data_buf, it's possible for invalid state to exploit
this to load arbitrary data.
setup_len and setup_index should be checked to make sure
they are not negative.
Cc: Gerd Hoffmann <kraxel@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Michael S. Tsirkin <mst@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Gerd Hoffmann <kraxel@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Juan Quintela <quintela@redhat.com>
(cherry picked from commit 9f8e9895c504149d7048e9fc5eb5cbb34b16e49a) Signed-off-by: Michael Roth <mdroth@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
As the macro verifies the value is positive, rename it
to make the function clearer.
Signed-off-by: Michael S. Tsirkin <mst@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Juan Quintela <quintela@redhat.com>
(cherry picked from commit 3476436a44c29725efef0cabf5b3ea4e70054d57) Signed-off-by: Michael Roth <mdroth@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Note: this adds security checks within assert calls since
SCSIBusInfo's load_request cannot fail.
For now simply disable builds with NDEBUG - there seems
to be little value in supporting these.
Cc: Andreas Färber <afaerber@suse.de> Signed-off-by: Michael S. Tsirkin <mst@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Juan Quintela <quintela@redhat.com>
(cherry picked from commit 3c3ce981423e0d6c18af82ee62f1850c2cda5976) Signed-off-by: Michael Roth <mdroth@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Within scoop_gpio_handler_update, if prev_level has a high bit set, then
we get bit > 16 and that causes a buffer overrun.
Since prev_level comes from wire indirectly, this can
happen on invalid state load.
Similarly for gpio_level and gpio_dir.
To fix, limit to 16 bit.
Reported-by: Michael S. Tsirkin <mst@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Michael S. Tsirkin <mst@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Dr. David Alan Gilbert <dgilbert@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Juan Quintela <quintela@redhat.com>
(cherry picked from commit 52f91c3723932f8340fe36c8ec8b18a757c37b2b) Signed-off-by: Michael Roth <mdroth@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
s->precision, nextprecision, function and nextfunction
come from wire and are used
as idx into resolution[] in TSC_CUT_RESOLUTION.
Validate after load to avoid buffer overrun.
Cc: Andreas Färber <afaerber@suse.de> Signed-off-by: Michael S. Tsirkin <mst@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Juan Quintela <quintela@redhat.com>
(cherry picked from commit 5193be3be35f29a35bc465036cd64ad60d43385f) Signed-off-by: Michael Roth <mdroth@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
s->cmd_len used as index in ssd0323_transfer() to store 32-bit field.
Possible this field might then be supplied by guest to overwrite a
return addr somewhere. Same for row/col fields, which are indicies into
framebuffer array.
To fix validate after load.
Additionally, validate that the row/col_start/end are within bounds;
otherwise the guest can provoke an overrun by either setting the _end
field so large that the row++ increments just walk off the end of the
array, or by setting the _start value to something bogus and then
letting the "we hit end of row" logic reset row to row_start.
For completeness, validate mode as well.
Signed-off-by: Michael S. Tsirkin <mst@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Peter Maydell <peter.maydell@linaro.org> Signed-off-by: Juan Quintela <quintela@redhat.com>
(cherry picked from commit ead7a57df37d2187813a121308213f41591bd811) Signed-off-by: Michael Roth <mdroth@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
s->arglen is taken from wire and used as idx
in ssi_sd_transfer().
Validate it before access.
Signed-off-by: Michael S. Tsirkin <mst@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Juan Quintela <quintela@redhat.com>
(cherry picked from commit a9c380db3b8c6af19546a68145c8d1438a09c92b) Signed-off-by: Michael Roth <mdroth@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
pxa2xx: avoid buffer overrun on incoming migration
CVE-2013-4533
s->rx_level is read from the wire and used to determine how many bytes
to subsequently read into s->rx_fifo[]. If s->rx_level exceeds the
length of s->rx_fifo[] the buffer can be overrun with arbitrary data
from the wire.
Fix this by validating rx_level against the size of s->rx_fifo.
Cc: Don Koch <dkoch@verizon.com> Reported-by: Michael Roth <mdroth@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Michael S. Tsirkin <mst@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Peter Maydell <peter.maydell@linaro.org> Reviewed-by: Don Koch <dkoch@verizon.com> Signed-off-by: Juan Quintela <quintela@redhat.com>
(cherry picked from commit caa881abe0e01f9931125a0977ec33c5343e4aa7) Signed-off-by: Michael Roth <mdroth@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Both virtio-block and virtio-serial read,
VirtQueueElements are read in as buffers, and passed to
virtqueue_map_sg(), where num_sg is taken from the wire and can force
writes to indicies beyond VIRTQUEUE_MAX_SIZE.
To fix, validate num_sg.
Reported-by: Michael Roth <mdroth@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Michael S. Tsirkin <mst@redhat.com> Cc: Amit Shah <amit.shah@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Juan Quintela <quintela@redhat.com>
(cherry picked from commit 36cf2a37132c7f01fa9adb5f95f5312b27742fd4) Signed-off-by: Michael Roth <mdroth@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Michael Roth [Mon, 28 Apr 2014 13:08:17 +0000 (16:08 +0300)]
openpic: avoid buffer overrun on incoming migration
CVE-2013-4534
opp->nb_cpus is read from the wire and used to determine how many
IRQDest elements to read into opp->dst[]. If the value exceeds the
length of opp->dst[], MAX_CPU, opp->dst[] can be overrun with arbitrary
data from the wire.
Fix this by failing migration if the value read from the wire exceeds
MAX_CPU.
Signed-off-by: Michael Roth <mdroth@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Reviewed-by: Alexander Graf <agraf@suse.de> Signed-off-by: Michael S. Tsirkin <mst@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Juan Quintela <quintela@redhat.com>
(cherry picked from commit 73d963c0a75cb99c6aaa3f6f25e427aa0b35a02e) Signed-off-by: Michael Roth <mdroth@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Michael Roth [Thu, 3 Apr 2014 16:51:46 +0000 (19:51 +0300)]
virtio: avoid buffer overrun on incoming migration
CVE-2013-6399
vdev->queue_sel is read from the wire, and later used in the
emulation code as an index into vdev->vq[]. If the value of
vdev->queue_sel exceeds the length of vdev->vq[], currently
allocated to be VIRTIO_PCI_QUEUE_MAX elements, subsequent PIO
operations such as VIRTIO_PCI_QUEUE_PFN can be used to overrun
the buffer with arbitrary data originating from the source.
Fix this by failing migration if the value from the wire exceeds
VIRTIO_PCI_QUEUE_MAX.
Signed-off-by: Michael Roth <mdroth@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Michael S. Tsirkin <mst@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Peter Maydell <peter.maydell@linaro.org> Signed-off-by: Juan Quintela <quintela@redhat.com>
(cherry picked from commit 4b53c2c72cb5541cf394033b528a6fe2a86c0ac1) Signed-off-by: Michael Roth <mdroth@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
vmstate: fix buffer overflow in target-arm/machine.c
CVE-2013-4531
cpreg_vmstate_indexes is a VARRAY_INT32. A negative value for
cpreg_vmstate_array_len will cause a buffer overflow.
VMSTATE_INT32_LE was supposed to protect against this
but doesn't because it doesn't validate that input is
non-negative.
Fix this macro to valide the value appropriately.
The only other user of VMSTATE_INT32_LE doesn't
ever use negative numbers so it doesn't care.
Reported-by: Anthony Liguori <anthony@codemonkey.ws> Signed-off-by: Michael S. Tsirkin <mst@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Juan Quintela <quintela@redhat.com>
(cherry picked from commit d2ef4b61fe6d33d2a5dcf100a9b9440de341ad62)
Conflicts:
vmstate.c
*removed dependency on b6fcfa59 (Move VMState code to vmstate.c)
Signed-off-by: Michael Roth <mdroth@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Fix comparison of vmstate_info_int32_le so that it succeeds if loaded
value is (l)ess than or (e)qual
When the comparison succeeds, assign the value loaded
This is a change in behaviour but I think the original intent, since
the idea is to check if the version/size of the thing you're loading is
less than some limit, but you might well want to do something based on
the actual version/size in the file
Fix up comment and name text
Signed-off-by: Dr. David Alan Gilbert <dgilbert@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Juan Quintela <quintela@redhat.com>
(cherry picked from commit 24a370ef2351dc596a7e47508b952ddfba79ef94)
Conflicts:
vmstate.c
*removed dependency on b6fcfa59 (Move VMState code to vmstate.c)
Signed-off-by: Michael Roth <mdroth@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
pl022.c did not bounds check tx_fifo_head and
rx_fifo_head after loading them from file and
before they are used to dereference array.
Reported-by: Michael S. Tsirkin <mst@redhat.com Reported-by: Anthony Liguori <anthony@codemonkey.ws> Signed-off-by: Michael S. Tsirkin <mst@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Juan Quintela <quintela@redhat.com>
(cherry picked from commit d8d0a0bc7e194300e53a346d25fe5724fd588387) Signed-off-by: Michael Roth <mdroth@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
hw/pci/pcie_aer.c: fix buffer overruns on invalid state load
4) CVE-2013-4529
hw/pci/pcie_aer.c pcie aer log can overrun the buffer if log_num is
too large
There are two issues in this file:
1. log_max from remote can be larger than on local
then buffer will overrun with data coming from state file.
2. log_num can be larger then we get data corruption
again with an overflow but not adversary controlled.
Fix both issues.
Reported-by: Anthony Liguori <anthony@codemonkey.ws> Reported-by: Michael S. Tsirkin <mst@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Michael S. Tsirkin <mst@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Dr. David Alan Gilbert <dgilbert@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Juan Quintela <quintela@redhat.com>
(cherry picked from commit 5f691ff91d323b6f97c6600405a7f9dc115a0ad1) Signed-off-by: Michael Roth <mdroth@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
hpet is a VARRAY with a uint8 size but static array of 32
To fix, make sure num_timers is valid using VMSTATE_VALID hook.
Reported-by: Anthony Liguori <anthony@codemonkey.ws> Signed-off-by: Michael S. Tsirkin <mst@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Dr. David Alan Gilbert <dgilbert@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Juan Quintela <quintela@redhat.com>
(cherry picked from commit 3f1c49e2136fa08ab1ef3183fd55def308829584) Signed-off-by: Michael Roth <mdroth@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Within hw/ide/ahci.c, VARRAY refers to ports which is also loaded. So
we use the old version of ports to read the array but then allow any
value for ports. This can cause the code to overflow.
There's no reason to migrate ports - it never changes.
So just make sure it matches.
Reported-by: Anthony Liguori <anthony@codemonkey.ws> Signed-off-by: Michael S. Tsirkin <mst@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Peter Maydell <peter.maydell@linaro.org> Signed-off-by: Juan Quintela <quintela@redhat.com>
(cherry picked from commit ae2158ad6ce0845b2fae2a22aa7f19c0d7a71ce5) Signed-off-by: Michael Roth <mdroth@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
virtio: out-of-bounds buffer write on invalid state load
CVE-2013-4151 QEMU 1.0 out-of-bounds buffer write in
virtio_load@hw/virtio/virtio.c
So we have this code since way back when:
num = qemu_get_be32(f);
for (i = 0; i < num; i++) {
vdev->vq[i].vring.num = qemu_get_be32(f);
array of vqs has size VIRTIO_PCI_QUEUE_MAX, so
on invalid input this will write beyond end of buffer.
Signed-off-by: Michael S. Tsirkin <mst@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Michael Roth <mdroth@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Juan Quintela <quintela@redhat.com>
(cherry picked from commit cc45995294b92d95319b4782750a3580cabdbc0c) Signed-off-by: Michael Roth <mdroth@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
projects / lisovros / qemu_apohw.git / log